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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
' 
Respondent, 
-vs. -
RAY CLARENCE RASMUSSEN , 
Appellant. 
RAY CLARENCE RASMUSSEN, 
Appellant, 
- vs. -
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10475 
Case No. 
10426 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Ray Clarence Rasmussen was convicted of the 
crime of second degree burglary upon jury trial 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County on July 
26 and 27, 1965. On July 26, 1965, the appellant filed 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, which petition 
for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Hon-
orable Aldon J. Anderson, who sat as trial judge on 
the appellant's subsequent trial on the charge of 
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second degree burglary. From the denial of the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus and the conviction 
of the second degree burglary charge the appel-
lant has prosecuted this appeal. Both matters were 
consolidated for appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crime of 
burglary in the second degree and arraigned in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County on June 2, 
1965. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus on July 21, 1965, on the grounds that 
he was denied a speedy trial. The petition for writ 
of habeas corpus was heard on the 26th day of 
July, 1965, and denied by the Honorable Aldon 
J. Anderson. Judge Anderson had theretofore on 
the 22nd day of July, 1965, denied a motion to &r:;-
miss for want of a speedy trial. The appellant was 
brought to trial on July 26, 1965, and on July 27, 
1965, was convicted and committed to the Utah 
State Prison. 
The respondent will adopt the references to 
the record as follows: 
Habeas corpus record - HCR 
Appeal record - R 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of 
the trial court in each instance should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following state-
ment of facts: 
The appellant was arrested on April 3, 196.S, 
and confined in the Salt Lake County Jail (HCR 1 ). 
He was arraigned in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County on the charge of second degree burglary 
on June 2, 1965. At the time of his arraignment, he 
was still confined in the Salt Lake County Jail and 
could not make bond (R 16). 
His trial was set for June 15, 1965. The appel-
lant contends that an oral demand for a speedy 
trial was made on June 15, 1965, which was the 
date originally set for trial. The case was not tried 
on June 15, 1965, because an automobile homicide 
case which was being tried was not finished (R 41). 
The case was thereafter set for trial on July 2, 196~. 
The case had been set for third place setting on 
June 15, 1965, and, consequently, when the auto-
mobile homicide case was not finished, was nor 
tried (HCR 24 and R 41 ). 
On July 2, 1965, the case was postponed be-
cause Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., the judge assigned 
to hear the case, became ill and was unable to 
handle the matter (R 41). On July 13, 1965, the ap-
pellant filed a written motion for a speedy trial 
(R 8 and HCR 19). The case was apparently set for 
the 21st day of July, 1965, but the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender's Office was not ready to try the case 
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because of an apparent failure to receive notice 
(R 39). 
On July 21, 1965, the same day that the prose-
cution had been ready to go forward with the case 
against the appellant, the appellant filed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from the 
custody of George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County, on the grounds that he was being denied 
a speedy trial (HCR 1). On July 22, 1965, a hearing 
was held before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, 
District Judge, on a motion of the appellant to dis-
miss the charges for want of a speedy trial (R 37). 
I udge Anderson denied the motion to dismiss based 
upon representations of counsel as to the relevant 
facts. It was stipulated by counsel for the State 
and the appellant that the failure to try the appe!-
lant at any of the times set was no fault of the court 
or the district attorney. This is acknowledged on 
page 4 of the appellant's brief. 
Prior to the appellant's trial on the 26th day 
of July, 1965, the date Judge Anderson set for the 
trial denying the motion to dismiss on July 22, 1965, 
the appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus 
based on denial of a speedy trial was heard. The 
petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied (HCR 
28). 
Based upon the above facts, the appellant con-
tends that he was denied a statutory and consti-
tutional right to a speedy trial. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT PRESENTS NO BASIS FOR 
HABEAS CORPUS ON APPEAL SINCE (A) THE 
HABEAS CORPUS ISSUE IS MOOT, AND (B) THE 
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT RECITE THAT IT WAS 
FROM A DENIAL OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
A. The appellant is presently confined at the 
Utah State Prison. He is no longer in the custody 
of George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
or any other officer of Salt Lake Countym. Further, 
the appellant has been convicted of the crime of 
second degree burglary, and the same issue is 
raised on appeal from his conviction as was raised 
in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that the appeal from the denial of 
the application for writ of habeas corpus is moot 
and should be dismissed. 
B. The notice of appeal filed by the appellant 
from the denial of his application for writ of habeas 
corpus states that the appellant appeals from "the 
judgment and conviction of the above entitled court 
which was entered on the 27th day of July, 1965, on 
the grounds that the decision was contrary to the 
evidence and that hearing in the above case was 
in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights 
in the federal and state constitutions." The notice 
of appeal does not recite that it is taken fro~ the 
denial of the appellant's application for wnt of 
(1) The court may take judicial notice of the death of Sheriff Beckstead 
and Judge Van Cott. 
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habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a civil proceed-
ing subject to the rules of civil procedure. Burleigh 
v. Turner. 15 U.2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 (1964). Rule 73 
(b) provides: 
"The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking 
the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part 
thereof appealed from; and shall designate that the 
appeal is taken to the Supreme Court." 
In the instant case, the notice of appeal does not 
designate the actual judgment appealed from. Con-
sequently, it does not comply with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the matter of the denial of 
the appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus 
is not properly before the court. Sierra Nevada Mill 
Company v. Keith O'Brien's. 48 Utah 12, 156 Pac. 
943 (1916). 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A STATU-
TORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL. 
The appellant contends that he was denied a 
speedy trial provided for by Section 77-1-8(6), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. That section provides: 
" ( 6) To have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed; and every defendant in a 
criminal action unable to get bail shall be entitled 
to a trial within thirty days after arraignment, if 
court is then in session in such county, otherwise 
the trial of such defendant shall be called on the 
first day of the next succeeding session of the court." 
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There is nothing in subsection (6) of Section 77-1-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that 
charges must be dismissed for failure to bring a 
defendant not admitted to bail to trial within 30 
days. Generally, most statutes making a statutory 
provision mandatory expressly provide for dismiss-
al. See Note, 57 Columbia L. Rev. 846. It is sub-
mitted, consequently, that the above provision is not 
manditory, but is directory and that an individual is 
not to dismissal of the charges for failure to be pro-
secuted within thirty days from the time of arraign-
ment, unless the failure is, itself, tantamount to a 
denial of speedy trial. 
Even so, it is generally recognize_d that the 
failure to comply with statutory requirements for 
a speedy trial does not entitle the defendant to dis-
missal of the charges or reversal of a conviction. 
if ther ewas justification for the delay. 
Thus, in Wharton's Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, Vol. 5, sec. 1912, speaking of the right to a 
speedy trial, it is stated: 
"This guaranty is not given a literal inte~pre~tior_i, 
and it has been held that the defendants right is 
not violated bv the mere fact that he is not tried at 
the next term of court, particularly when he con-
sented to such delay, or raised no obj~ction to P?st-
ponement or caused the delay by his own action, 
or was ab~ent from the state. Delay is excuse~ when 
the attorney for the prosecution was otherwise e~­
gaged, or when other business of the court or cli-
matic conditions require postponement when a con-
tinuance was properly.granted, or ~~en the defendant 
was imprisoned for another offense. 
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. ,• . -
See also Abbott Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., -p. 
252; People v. Bagato. 27 Ill.2d 165, 188 N.E.2d 716 
(1963); 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 246. 
This is, of course, a necessary corollary to the rule, 
since, generally, retrial is not barred by the failure 
to meet the requirements. Note, Dismissal of the 
Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to 
a Speedy Trial, 64 Yale L. J. 1208 _(1955); Note, 57 
Columbia L Rev. 846, supra; 21 Am. Jur2d, Section 
145. 
In the instant case, the appellant was arraigned 
on June 2, 1965. If it is assumed that the provisions 
of Section 77-1-8(6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are 
mandatory, rather than directory, it still appears that 
there was sufficient justification for the delay, so 
that a denial of a right to a speedy trial was not 
involved. On June 15, 1965, well within the 30-day 
period, the appellant's trial was set. However, be-
cause of other court business, specifically, that ano-
ther trial ]:iad not ended, the appellant's case could 
not be heard. The case was reset on July 2, 1965, 
again within the 30-day period. However, at that 
time, Judge Van Cott became ill and the case could 
not be heard (R 41).<2) Up to that time, the only evi-
dence in the record . of a demand for a speedy trial 
is a contention of _the appellant that his counsel 
. made such a request at the time of his arraignment 
on the 2nd day of June, 1965. There was nothing ln 
- the minutes of the court to support that conclusion. 
A formal written demand was not filed until July 
(2) Judge Van Cott subsequently died, which certainly indicates that 
the illness was not an insignificant one. 
9 
13, 1965. cf. State v. Bowen. 67 Utah 362, 748 Pac. 
119 (1926). Trial was again apparently set on July 
21, 1965, and at that time, the appellant's counsel 
did not appear for the trial, although the prosecution 
was present and ready to proceed. Trial was had 
the same day as the appellant's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus was denied. It was stipulated be-
tween the parties at the time of trial and at the time 
of the hearing on the motion to dismiss the charges 
because of the lack of a speedy trial that the delay 
was in no way caused by the prosecution or the 
fault of the prosecution, but was a matter of cir-
cumstances. 
Under these facts, it is apparent that there has 
been a showing of good cause for the delay and the 
failure to meet the statutory time period, assuming 
it is mandatory, rather than directory, would not 
justify dismissal of the charges against the appel-
lant. 
In King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, (D.C. Cir. 
1959), a similar situation was placed before the 
United States Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia. The appellant King had been indicted and 
was convicted of the crime of assault with a dan-
gerous weapon. On appeal, he contended that he 
was denied a speedy trial. The offense occurred 
October 27, 1956. On December 3, 1956, an indict-
ment was returned and on December 7, 1956, King 
was arraigned. The case was set for trial January 
14, 1957, and continued to January 28, 1957, on the 
defendant's motion. On January 28, February 7, 
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March 20, and April 15, 1957, the case was con-
tinued "for the reason, in the parlance of the court-
house, 'no court available.'" In speaking of the 
facts, the court observed: 
"Certain features of the foregoing sequence of 
events are to be noted. First of all, the prosecutor 
had no part in any of the delays. He never requested 
or occasioned a continuance. Indeed it is easy to 
imagine that the edge of his case might have been 
dulJed by the repeated vain excursions to the court-
house by the eye-witnesses presented by the Gov-
ernment, the only witnesses (save King) in the case. 
King has not claimed an inaccuracy in their account. 
In the second place, of the seven continuances, three 
were on King's behalf; of the 140 days which elapsed, 
some 60 days of delay were requested or occasioned 
by King himself. In the third place, King does not 
allege any prejudice by reason of the delay. As we 
have noted, there were a number of eyewitnesses; the 
accounts of all, including King, tallied substantially, 
no one denied that King cut Smith. The only is-
sue was whether the cutting of Smith was pure ac-
cident or the result of a furious, blind slashing about. 
No doubt this problem lies at a spot where the ideal 
clashes head-on with the practical. Ideally, maybe 
every accused person would be indicted or released 
the day he is arrested and, if indicted, however, 
would not be deemed ideal by those indicted per-
sons whose interests are best served by delay, -and 
there are doubtless many such. In any event practi-
calities prevent any such Utopia - if it be Utopia. 
Lawyers often need time for preparation, and wit-
nesses frequently need to be found and, when found, 
must have advance notice to attend. Moreover, 
cases have to take their tum. The case on trial is 
entitled to d2liberate consideration; the others on 
the calendar stack up. At the same time, too ~uc? 
heed to practicalities may encroach upon the md1-
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:idual's rights. If the legislature were to refuse to 
~ns~a~l sufficient judicial machinery to perform the 
JUd1c1al tasks, it might be necessary to turn some 
accused persons loose. But the present situation is 
far from that hypothetical crisis. The problem here 
is to dispose of the present number of criminal 
cases through use of a reasonable amount of judicial 
machinery. A method of disposition which reason-
ably accommodates practicalities is not illegal. 
We think the delay here (a total of 140 days 60 days 
of which was requested by defense counsel) 'between 
arraignment and trial, on account of a crowded 
calendar, is not such a prolonged period as to be 
denial of speedy trial in a constitutional sense. The 
fact that the rlalay was in successive bits instead of 
by one long postponement is immaterial to the pro-
blem of constitutionality, where the off-and-on pro-
gram has no harmful impact on defense witnesses ... 
In any procedural practice short of the trial, it is 
easy to find some element which could be called 
illegal. But, where a method is chosen because it 
meets the practical problems of a court and is clearly 
within the realm of the reasonable, we do not ad-
vance the cause of justice by harsh condemnation. 
We have neither the data nor the means with which 
to devise another method of putting an average of 
five new cases a day on the District Court's calen-
dar. Sometimes we are compelled to declare a pro-
cedural practice void without even considering pos-
sible alternates; we do not feel so compelled here. 
We do suggest that the District Court give the prob-
lem continui!lg attention, especially in respect of 
defendants held in jail. 
Indeed we werf told at oral argument that experi-
mental variations from the practice here involved 
were then already under way. We find no rev.ersible 
error in this phase of the present case, despite the 
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earnest and intelligent presentation by counsel who 
undertook this duty at the court's behest." 
The California courts have clearly recognized 
that good cause justifies the failure to comply with 
the time periods set forth for trial under Sections 
1381 and 1382 of the California Penal Code.<3> Peo-
ple v. Rucker, 121 Cal.App. 361, 8 P.Zd 938. 
In State v. Squier, 56 Nev. 386, 54 P.Zd 227 (1936), 
the defendant claimed denial of a speedy trial. The 
date of the crime was May 17, 1934, and the infor-
mation filed June 9, 1934. Arraignment was on June 
25, 1934. July 9, 1934, was set for the date of the 
trial. On July 3, 1934, the court on its own motion, 
because of congested calendar, continued the trial 
until September 17, 1934. The court noted that the 
defendant had at this time demanded a speedy 
trial and accepted to the order continuing the mat-
ter until September 17, 1934. Extremely hot weather, 
lack of court facilitie5, and a congested calendar 
were the reasons for the continuation. The con-
tention was made that the failure to try the de-
fendant violated the provisions of 1194 Nevada 
Compiled Laws. The Nevada Supreme Court de-
termined that there was no violation of any consti-
tutional or statutory right. The court stated that the 
fact other cases arose necessitating the continuance 
and the lack of appropriate courtroom facilities to 
(3) Research has not disclosed a statute comparable to that in Utah. 
Most of the time periods are substantially longer and expressly 
provided for dismissal, in the event of failure to go to trial during 
the time period. Good cause is usually deemed an excuse for failure 
to comply wifu the statutory period. Note, 57 Columbia L. Rev. 846. 
cf. People v. Bagato_ 27 ID.2d 165, 188 N.E.2d 716 (1963). 
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accommodate a jury in hot weather were sufficient 
justification for the delay. 
In State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 875, 313 P.2d 753 
(1957), the Arizona Supreme Court was concerned 
with whether the failure to bring the defendant to 
trial within a 60-day period described by Rule 236 
of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, form-
erly Section 1274 of the Arizona Penal Code. The 
Arizona court indicated that the rule provision, 
which expressly provided for dismissal, required 
the case to be dismissed "unless good cause is 
shown." In the Churchill case, a minute entry re-
flected that there were judges absent from the 
county which prevented the case from being tried 
within the 60-day period and an especially heavy 
work load. The court ruled that the absence of trir~l 
judges in the county justified the delay. The court 
said that before a defendant was entitled to dis-
missal under the provisions of Rule 236, he "must 
bring himself within the spirit and intention of the 
rule." The court said: 
"The principal purpose being not to allow the guilty 
to escape upon technicalities, but to shield the in-
nocent by preventing unnecessary and unreasona~le 
delays. Good cause means substantial reason; that is, 
one that affords a legal excuse." 
See also Castle v. State, 143 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1957); 
People v. Denuyl. 320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 
(1948); State v. Werner. 105 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1960). 
All of the above cases support the proposition 
that in factual situations similar to the instant case, 
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the appellant cannot contend that he should be 
relieved from a conviction for failure to comply with 
a statutory request that a trial be had within a par-
ticular period of time. 
In the case of State v. Endsley, 19 Utah 478, 
57 Pac. 430 (1899), the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that a defendant could have his case dismissed 
under Section 5065 of the Revised Statutes of 1898, 
it was necessary for him to prove that he was en-
titled to dismissal. The court said: 
"Doubtless, by this statute, the legislature intended 
to secure to every defendant in a criminal prosecution 
a speedy trial, in the absence of good cause being 
shown for delay.***" 
Since good cause appeared in the instant case. 
even though a different statute was involved, the 
appellant is not entitled to acquittal on the charges. 
In State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Ore. 478, 272 P.2d 
225 (1954), the Oregon Supreme Court had before it 
a similar issue to that now before this court. Ore-
gon Revised Statutes, Section 134-10, provided that 
a defendant who is not brought to trial at the ap-
propriate term of court was entitled to have charges 
dismissed. The Oregon court ruled that there was 
both a statutory and a constitutional right to a 
speedy trial to avoid oppressive delay. The Ore-
gon court ruled that the statutory provision was 
merely an enactment pursuant to the constitutional 
provision. The court ruled that dismissal would 
only lie if there was no cause sufficient to support 
the delay. The court indicated that the congestion 
of the trial docket was a sufficient basis for the de-
lay. The opinion is well documented with sub-
stantial authority and able reasoning. 
Applying the above case law to the relevant 
Utah statute, it is apparent that there is no statutory 
basis for the release of the appellant. 
The appellant's contention that he is entitled 
to release because of an inordinate delay resulting 
in the violation of his constitutional rights is equally 
without merit. The provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution in Amendment VI requiring a speedy trial 
have not as yet been incorporated in the due pro-
cess clause of the XIVth Amendment against the 
states. However, the Federal Constitution undoubt-
edly would be violated if some specific prejudice 
resulted from unconscionable delay. 21 Am. Jur.2d, 
Criminal Law, Section 241. In any event, Article L 
Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
guarantees that an accused shall have the right 
to a speedy trial. 
In State v. Mathis. 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957) 
this court stated with reference to the state consti-
tutional demand: 
" 'Speedy trial' as used in our Constit~tion and sta-
tutes is necessarily a somewhat flexible term. It 
must be interpreted and applied in accordanc~ with 
the practical exigencies to be encountere~ m the 
handling of the business of the courts. Desirable. as 
it may be to accommodate those accused of crnne 
with expeditious procedures, which the courts are 
usually anxiom to do, a defendant cannot demand 
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the impossible, nor should he be permitted to take 
advantage of an adverse situation and insist that the 
the charge against him be dismissed because of the 
unexpected absence of a key witness, when it ap-
pears that the witness would be available within a 
reasonable time. It would be high handed and se-
vere to refuse a continuance to either side caught in 
such circumstances. 
The law is, or at least those who devote their lives 
to it like to think it is, the embodiment of reason 
and good sense. The duty of the court in administer-
ing justice carries deeper responsibilities than presid-
ing over a game of tricks. This would be the result 
of arbitrarily dismissing an action when one counsel 
finds himself in a position of disadvantage because of 
the unexpected absence of an important witness. 
Experience te'.lches that in the arranging of trials 
and the marshalling of witnesses, sometimes either 
the prosecution or the defense may inadvertently 
find itself um1ble safely to proceed to trial. While 
diligence in preparation should be insisted upon, the 
courts necessarily must be somewhat indulgent of 
perplexing situations which arise, to the end that 
both sides have a fair opportunity to present their 
respective cases." 
The meaning of speedy trial is not a term fixed ac-
cording to absolute rules and regulations, but is 
primarily directed to holding the defendant free 
from vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays. 
21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 243. The mere 
lapse of time does not necessarily mean that a de-
fendant has been denied a speedy trial. General-
ly, there must be some vexatiousness or capricious-
ness which interferes with the proper administration 
of justice. 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, SecHon 251. 
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In State v. Hartman. 136 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1965), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a five-
month delay between the time of arrest and the 
time of prosecution where the defendant was un-
able to make bail would not, in and of itself, con-
stitute a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The 
court said there was no showing of any prejudice 
or vexatiousness to the injury of the defendant and, 
therefore, no violation of his constitutional rights. 
Federal courts have required a substantially grea~­
er showing of unwarranted delay before finding a 
constitutional violation than can be claimed in the 
instant case. Thus, it has been stated that the right 
to a speedy trial "is necessarily relative. It is con-
sistent with delays and depends upon circum-
stances." Beavers v. Haubert. 198 U.S. 77 (1905)· 
Corbin, Constitution of the United States of Amer-
ica Anno. (1963), pp. 1000, 1001. Research has dis-
closed no case comparable to the fact situation in 
the instant case, where an appellate court has con-
cluded that a defendant has been denied his con-
stitutional rights to a speedy trial. 
Recently, in United States v. Ewell. U.S. 34 L.W. 
3154, February 23, 1966, the United States Supreme 
Court considered the question of whether a defend-
ant was denied a constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. It appeared that the appellee had been con-
victed of selling narcotics under a federal statute 
in 1962. In 1963, Ewell filed a motion to vacate his 
conviction, which was granted in April of 1964. 
Ewell was then rearrested and new complaints is.-
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sued, reindicting the defendant on June 15, 1964. 
The government dismissed some of the charges 
on which Ewell had been originally convicted and 
prosecuted on one charge that had been known 
to it at the time of the original charges. The trial 
court dismissed the new complaint and the United 
States Supreme Court reversed. The court stated: 
"We cannot agree that the charge of 19 months be-
tween the original arrest and the hearings on the 
later indictments, itself, demonstrates a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial. 
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent 
undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, 
to minl.mize anxiety and concern accompying public 
accommodation and to limit the possibilities that 
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to 
defend himself. However, in a large measure, be-
cause of the many procedural safeguards provided 
an accused, the orderly procedures for criminal pro-
secution are designed to move at a deliberate pace. 
The requirement of unreasonable speed would have 
a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the ac-
cused and upon the ability of society to protect it-
self; Therefore, this court has consistently been 
of the view that 'the right of a speedy trial is neces-
sarily relative. It is consistent with delays and de-
pends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a 
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public 
justice.' Beavers v. Haubert, 190 U.S. 77, 78. 'Whe-
ther the delay in completing a prosecution amounts 
to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends 
upon all the circumstances. ****The delay must not 
be purposeful or oppressive,' Pollard v. United States, 
352 U.S. 354, 361. 'The essential ingredient is or-
derly expedition and not mere speed.' Smith v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10." 
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Since the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah bear substantial 
similarity, decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court should be deemed relevant to the construc-
tion of the Utah Constitution. It is apparent that the 
decisions from the United States Supreme Court 
would not support a determination of a denial of the 
right to a speedy trial in the instant case. Further, 
those decisions are comparable to the position 
adopted by this court in State v. Mathis. supra. 
In this case, the appellant has acknowledged 
that the delay was not the fault of the prosecution 
and the record amply demonstrates only a smail 
delay with no prejudice to the appellant. What 
delay there was is attributable to the illness of the 
trial judge, delays inherent in the handling of cases 
and, to some extent, the failure of the appellant's 
counsel to go forward at one point. 
It is submitted that the record is totally unsup-
porting of the appellant's contention. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of the case make it manifest that there 
was no constitutional or statutory denial of the ap-
pellant's right to a speedy trial. Indeed, every effort 
was made to expedite the appellant's case with 
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reasonable dispatch to a final decision. The facts of 
this case afford no basis for reversal. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
